For example, Gedob was forced torequisitionor refurbish all of the surviving rolling stock of the former Polish railsystem.Regretfully, much of the Polish system was seriously damaged in the fourweeks offighting. After 1941, the rail lines of ex-Austrian Galacia were added to theGedob.Gedob had to start from scratch as Germany was not in a position at thattime to redirect”surplus” rolling stock to the new entity.
From 1939 to 1941, Gedob controlled only therail lines inthe GG. This was a separate entity from the DR and itwasresponsible for the administration of the railways in the GG (Poland).Within the Gedobstructure, a number of sub-sections or sub-units were also created to betterserve theneeds of the German military. On 26 October 1939, the “Gedob” (Generaldirektion der Ostbahn) wasestablished withit’s headquarters in Warsaw. For the overwhelming number of cases, however, the DRperformed itsduties as expected using German forces as they were available. As the Germans occupied one nation after another, nativenationalswere also pressed into service as auxiliary railway personnel in theirrespective nations -this included many Estonians, Latvians, Lithuanians as well as Slavicpeoples on theeastern front. Thus, alarge numberof already trained and qualified former Polish railway personnel werepressed intoGerman service. Ofnote is that for this effort, not only did the DR and the Reichsarbeitsdienst (RAD) provided the needed personnel – (ethnic) Polish railroading companies orenterpriseswere also contracted (salaried) to support the German war effort. Quickly, acrashtraining program was initiated for the creation of an additional railwayengineer troops. As a result of this deficit, many key sections of the Polishtrack remainedunpassable for periods of time exceeding the desires of the OKW. On the negative side, the DR and the Oberkommando der Wehrmacht (OKW)quicklyrealized that the WH did not possess sufficient numbers of Eisenbahnpionier(railwayengineer) troops.
By the middle of October 1939, the DR and the WHhad re-established full rail service between Berlin and Koenigsberg and Breslauto Oppeln, both via Warsaw.ĭuring the Polish campaign, the DR not only played a key role in movinglarge numbersof German troops to their front-line positions, the DR also evacuatedwounded troopsback to rear areas and often served as portable field kitchens for largerconcentrations oftroops. At the conclusionof the Polish Campaign, all of the battles damaged Polish rail lines had to be repairedbefore the DR could gain unimpeded access to the entire Polish railway network in the newGeneral-Government (GG). The Luftwaffe (LH) contributed to thedamage inflicted onto the Polish rail lines by bombing numerous key Polish railwayjunctions and yards as they completed their interdiction assignments. Throughout the Polish campaign, the DR was able to satisfy all of the supplyand movement needs of the German Army despite the fact that Polish militaryforces successfully disrupted, if not outrightly destroyed, large sections of thePolish railway network as they retreated inward.
This task was successfullyaccomplished by the DR prior to 01 September 1939.
The DR’s last major peacetime assignment prior to the start of theSecond World War was to transport all of the Wehrmacht’s (WH) 86 non-motorized divisionsto their respective (offensive) staging positions along the Polish border and totheir (defensive) positions along Germany’s western borders. In most of these circumstances, thePanzerzuege were called to assist another train to remove itself from harm’s way (breakdown,enemy action, etc.). Only in rare circumstances did theyengage themselves in transporting goods or troops. Germany’s “Panzerzuege” (Armored Trains) were controlled and commandeddirectly by the German military at all times. The DR was a separateentity from the German military’s rail arm. Despite the military’s control ofthe DR during the war, the DR also continued to serve the needs of German or Germancontrolled economic entities (industry, civilian traffic, etc.). In times of war, the DRadhered to military regulations and as such was placed under the guidance of the GermanArmy General Staff’s Transportation Division. It need be noted thatthe DR was first and foremost a civilian or commercial organization, supporting theneeds of the German Wehrmacht if and when ordered to do so. The primary focus of this article will be to evaluate the strengths and weaknesses of theDeutsche Reichsbahn Gesellschaft (DRG, also DR for short).